There is good reason to think that the best understanding of the equality principle of the United States Constitution has a great deal to do with a prohibition on second-class citizenship, or "caste."1 An anticaste principle can claim considerable support from the the ory and the practice of those who defend the Fourteenth Amend ment. Such a principle also fits well -far from perfectly, but well -with the general fabric and thrust of constitutional doctrine. As a matter of political theory, the anticaste principle also has consid erable appeal, connected as it is with some of the defining ideals of liberal democracy, which is designed to ensure that morally irrele vant characteristics are not turned into a systematic basis for social disadvantage.2 The anticaste principle seems to serve as a promis ing basis for both organizing and reformulating many aspects of the law of equal protection.
Of course the implications of the anticaste principle must be specified, and here reasonable people can differ. I have urged, for * Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chi cago. A.B. 1975 , J.D. 1978 1. The point is argued in Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. RE.v.
{1994).
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example, that the principle forbids government from turning mor ally irrelevant and highly visible characteristics into a basis for sys temic social disadvantage. Whether or not that particular specification is valid, and whether or not it counts as a sufficient specification, it seems clear that the anticaste principle would raise no serious questions about affirm ative action policies. The basic reason is that it is implausible to say that such policies entrench second-class citizenship. No one urges, or could urge, that such pol icies would make whites, or for that matter African Americans, into second-class citizens. This is not to say that affirm ative action poli cies are a good idea. To be sure, they may have stigmatizing effects on their intended beneficiaries, and they may also increase rather than decrease racial antagonism. But these are essentially political complaints, not constitutional ones. Some people, for example, ob ject that affirm ative action programs reflect pity and condescension toward African Americans3 -an interesting objection to the meaning and consequences of such programs, not entirely discon nected from the problem of second-class citizenship. But this ob jection, partly empirical in nature, is best heard in legislatures rather than courtrooms.
Clark Cunningham and N.R. Madhava Menon have contributed a great deal to the debate over racial equality through their intrigu ing discussion of caste, and anticaste, in India. American legal de bates are often remarkably parochial, and the American debate over the anticaste principle has given strikingly little attention to comparative questions. This is an especially serious omission in light of the fact that the caste system in India seems to be a primary inspiration for those complaining about caste-like features of American life. Let me emphasize a few of the valuable points that Cunnin gham and Menon offer. First, they suggest that the Indian caste system operates without "highly visible" characteristics.
High-caste Indians might look much like low-caste Indians. Sec ond, they suggest that in India, systemic social disadvantages began first, and only later created stigmatic differences to "mark the dis advantage." In America, the sequence was, or seems to have been, just the opposite. Thus, in India caste is "clearly a social construc tion," unlike in the United States, where it is believed that "race" is an immutable and obvious physical condition.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, India has gone down the route not traveled by the United States, which has adhered to the 3. See SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED (1998). 
I. FACTS RATHER THAN CONCEPTS
Constitutional and political debates about equality and liberty often operate at a high level of abstraction. They raise questions, for example, about whether we are committed to equality of oppor tunity or instead equality of result, to individual rights or group rights, or to equality over liberty or vice-versa. Often the argu ments work by choosing one concept over another, by assembling some particular practice that is said to tell, decisively, against a cer-tain claim or alleged principle (for example, the generally accepted preferential treatment given to children of alumni), by suggesting that a certain concept necessarily means a certain thing (as in the view that equality necessarily forbids, or requires, affirmative ac tion), or by specifying a concept with the suggestion that this, rather than that, is the best specification (perhaps because it fits better with the rest of what we believe).
These debates, though common and frequently illuminating, often seem hopelessly conceptual and interminable, stylized, a form of Kabuki theater; often no one is convinced at all, and, even worse, often no one learns anything. I think that a great deal of further progress might be made by learning more about the facts. It is very hard to know where to stand on affirmative action programs with out investigating some empirical questions. What do such programs look like? How do they differ? The term "affirmative action" is extremely broad, and it covers a wide range of activities in the pri vate and public sectors and at the national, state, and local levels. These questions are important because when progress cannot be made on conceptual matters or on issues in high-level theory, it might instead be made by investigating facts. This is the great promise of empirical work: to enable progress and even closure when conceptual debates produce uncertainty, holy wars, or blank stares. I hypothesize, for example, that many people would be skeptical of affirm ative action programs to the extent that the rec ord shows that they involve hiring people whose qualifications are not marginally lower, but actually much lower than those of their (majority group) competitors. It also seems likely that many critics of affirm ative action would be less critical if it appeared that the abolition of affirmative action would mean that only a handful of African Americans would be able to attend the major law schools.
When people disagree on high principle, they can often be brought into agreement, or at least make progress, if they investi gate the facts.5 In the context of affirm ative action we need much more in the way of facts. A Supreme Court brief dealing with the consequences of a principle of colorblindness would be far more helpful than a brief quoting from past cases and pushing conceptual arguments one way rather than another. The discussion by Cunningham and Menon is very much in this spirit insofar as com parative work brings actual experience to bear on equality claims.
II. AGAINST RuLES, AGAINST JumcIAL REsoLUTIONs6
It is tempting to think that the Supreme Court has erred in maintaining its casuistical, rule-free, fact-spe c ific course in the con At the same time, it would be wrong to celebrate the democratic character of the institutions that have adopted affirmative action programs. On the contrary, the nation has not, until recently, had much of a debate about affirm ative action, and some of the relevant programs have been adopted with far too little deliberation and far too little democracy. In these circumstances, the Court has adopted, perhaps by inadvertence, an intriguing alternative to the three conventional options of validation, invalidation, and denial of certiorari. That alternative consists of rulings that draw sharp at-5. Thus facts are a great ally, and a potential part, of incompletely specified agreements.
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6. I borrow here from CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 117-36 (1999 The most obvious response is that this is a genuinely academic question. There is no possibility that the United States would at tempt to identify the fifty groups, let alone the 3,500 groups, which ought to qualify as backward classes. But as in India, the existence of a political consensus or obstacle cannot be decisive; perhaps the consensus or obstacle is wrong. Our own anticaste principle, re flected in our history and our practices, seems to emphasize highly visible identifying characteristics (most notably race and gender), In addition, and perhaps most importantly, it is easiest to main tain a caste society, even when market forces are quite vigorous, when the characteristics that lead to lower-caste status are highly visible. It is in such circumstances that customers and coworkers can most easily entrench existing inequality.12 It is in such circum stances that rational discrimination may result in the use of sex and race as proxies. And it is in such circumstances that screening strat-9. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 344 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ. , concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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11. See the excellent discussion in AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996 egies may perpetuate social subordination.13 Market forces are es pecially unpromising correctives to caste-like aspects of society when a highly visible characteristic is at work in the context of sys temic social disadvantages.
None of these points suggests that this limited anticaste princi ple, understood by reference to American understandings and ex periences, is ideal, even for America. Surely the anticaste principle does not exhaust the content of the notion of equality. At a mini mum, there is also a place for an antidiscrimination principle, for fair equality of opportunity (an idea that cuts very broadly), and for programs of redistribution designed to ensure that everyone lives in minimally decent conditions. These ideas overlap with the anticaste principle but are independent of it. It is even possible to think that the three ideas would do most of the good work done by the anti caste efforts in India, perhaps more successfully. Thus, for example, I might speculate that an effort to ensure fair equality of opportu nity, and minimally decent conditions for all, bears something of the same relation to the Indian experience as a negative income tax bears to minimum wage legislation. A negative income tax is a far more effective and direct way of assisting the poor than a minimum wage increase.14 So too, an insistence on fair equality of opportu nity and minimally decent conditions might well be a far more ef fective and direct way of dealing with systemic disadvantages than India's extremely complex affirmative action program.
For America, with its very different history, a large question is whether a limited anticaste principle, suitably supplemented with these other ideals, is not a better approach to the problem of in equality than an approach that would attempt compensatory mea sures for a wide range of socially disadvantaged groups. It is even possible to wonder whether India might not have done better to adopt a narrower anticaste principle for the most disadvantaged groups, and to attempt to promote other equality goals with other policies, including better education and job training, and minimal economic and social guarantees for all, ensuring against desperate [Vol. 97:1311 cially so in their different conceptions of what it means to undo a system of caste.
CONCLUSION
For constitutional purposes, the American equality principle has been an anticaste principle -one that forbids government from turning a morally irrelevant and highly visible characteristic into a systemic basis for second-class citizenship. This principle ought not to be taken to authorize federal judges to invalidate reasonable af firmative action programs. The appropriate content of such pro grams should be a democratic rather than a judicial responsibility; the most extreme judicial attacks on affirm ative action programs are a form of hubris.
On the other hand, we know far too little to declare that our current programs are working well. There are two promising paths for the future, both of them involving facts. The first is to learn a great deal more about the operations, achievements, and failures of multiple approaches, race-conscious and otherwise, and to see 
